Modica and Rustichini 1994] provided a logic for reasoning about knowledge where agents may be unaware of certain propositions. However, their original approach had the unpleasant property that nontrivial unawareness was incompatible with partitional information structures. More recently, Modica and Rustichini 1999] have provided an approach that allows for nontrivial unawareness in partitional information structures. Here it is shown that their approach can be viewed as a special case of a general approach to unawareness considered by Fagin and Halpern 1988] .
Introduction
The standard approach to reasoning about knowledge Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995] implicitly assumes that agents are (commonly known to be) aware of all the relevant propositions. However, in decision theory under uncertainty, we must often deal with unforeseen contingencies. (See Dekel, Lipman, and Rusticchini 1997] for a discussion of issues related to unforeseen contingencies and further references.) Thus, we would like to be able to model agents who are not necessarily aware of all the relevant propositions.
In the economics literature, an initial attempt to do this was made by Modica and Rustichini 1994] (MR from now on). They provided a logic where awareness was de ned in terms of knowledge. An agent was aware of p if he either knew p or knew he did Supported in part by NSF under grant IRI-96-25901. not know p. Unfortunately, the original MR approach had the unpleasant property that nontrivial unawareness was incompatible with partitional information structures. More recently 1999], MR provided an approach that allows for nontrivial unawareness in partitional information structures.
As MR observe, in the Arti cial Intelligence/Computer Science literature, Fagin and Halpern 1988] (FH from now on) had earlier introduced a model of knowledge and unawareness. However, in this model, unawareness is introduced as a separate modal operator, independent of knowledge, rather than being de ned in terms of knowledge. Nevertheless, as I show here, by making some assumptions on the connection between knowledge and awareness (assumptions that are actually discussed explicitly by FH), the MR de nition becomes a special case of the FH de nition.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I brie y review the FH de nitions and in Section 3, I brie y review the MR de nitions. The fact that the MR de nitions can be viewed as a special case of the FH de nitions is proved in Section 4. In Section 5, complete axiomatizations are provided for the FH notions of knowledge and (un)awareness. I do not give much in the way of motivation here for the FH and MR de nitions here; I would encourage the reader to consult the original papers for details.
The FH de nitions
The intuition behind the FH approach is that there is implicit knowledge|the notion traditionally considered in the AI and economics literature|where agents are aware of all propositions and can do perfect reasoning with respect to these propositions, and explicit knowledge which, roughly speaking, is intended to capture those conclusions of which agents are explicitly aware. Explicit knowledge implies implicit knowledge, but the converse does not hold in general.
To capture this intuition, FH start with a set = fp; q; : : :g of primitive propositions, and build more complicated formulas by closing under the propositional connectivesâ nd : and the modal operators K (for implicit knowledge), X (for explicit knowledge) and A (for awareness). 1 Let L KXA ( ) denote the resulting language; let L XA ( ), (resp., L KA ( ); L K ( ); L X ( )) denote the sublanguages of L KXA ( ) where the only modal operators are X and A (resp., K and A; K; X). I typically omit the parenthesized if it does not play an important role. As usual, ' _ is taken to be an abbreviation for :(:'^: ) and ' ) taken to be an abbreviation for :' _ .
An awareness structure is a tuple M = (S; ; K; A), where S is a set of states or possible worlds, associates with each primitive proposition p 2 an event (p) S (intuitively, (p) However, I focus here on the sublanguages L X and L XA , where the X operator clearly plays a nontrivial role.
What exactly does awareness mean and what should the relationship between knowledge and awareness be? MR have one particular interpretation in mind, which leads them to de ne A' as X' _ X:X'. 3 Given their assumptions about the X operator a number of properties of awareness follow, such as the fact that an agent is aware of ' i she is aware of :'. In FH, awareness is taken as a primitive notion, open to a number of interpretations. The appropriate application depends on the application. One possible interpretation is certainly that suggested by MR, but it might also be reasonable to consider a \computational" notion of awareness, where awareness of ' corresponds to \being able to compute the truth of ' (perhaps within some time or space bounds)".
Such an interpretation leads to a resource-bounded notion of knowledge. Under this interpretation, an agent may not be aware of tautologies, for example, and the agent may be aware of ' without being aware of :' (adding a negation may be just enough to make the formula too long for the agent to deal with).
Of course, once we have a concrete interpretation in mind, it will suggest some restrictions on A (or, equivalently, some axioms that awareness should satisfy 
The converse is even easier. Clearly if (M; s) j = FH X', by de nition, (M; s) j = FH A'. Since awareness is generated by primitive propositions, from (M; s) j = FH X:X' it also follows that (M; s) j = FH A'. This completes the proof.
Thus, if we restrict to partitional awareness structures where awareness is generated by primitive propositions, we can de ne A in terms of X as MR do. That is, L XA is equivalent in expressive power to L X . An even stronger connection between the de nitions of FH and MR is given in Section 4. To state it, I need to review the de nitions of MR's semantic structures.
3 The MR de nitions MR also start with a set of primitive propositions, and then close o under the modal operator X. 4 They give semantics to formulas in L X using generalized standard models (GSMs). A GSM is a tuple M = (S; S 0 ; ; P; ) whose components satisfy the following conditions:
S, as before, is a set of states.
4 MR use lower case k and a for knowledge and unawareness. I am using upper case for consistency with the notation of FH and explicit knowledge (X) rather than implicit knowledge (K), since the notion of knowledge in Modica and Rustichini 1999] is closer to FH's explicit knowledge. MR also have an operator 3, but since 3' is de ned as an abbreviation for :X:'^A', I ignore 3 here, with no loss of generality.
S 0 is also a set of states; moreover S 0 = S 0 , where the sets S 0 are disjoint.
Intuitively, the agent is aware of only the formulas with propositions in at the states in S 0 .
(p), as before, is a subset of S, for each p 2 . P is a generalized possibility correspondence; P(s) is a subset of S 0 for each s 2 S.
is a projection from S to S 0 (i.e., an onto map from S to S 0 ) such that (1) if (s) = (t) 2 S 0 then (a) s and t agree on the truth values of all primitive propositions in , that is, s 2 (p) i t 2 (p) for all p 2 and (b) P(s) = P(t) and (2) if (s) 2 S 0 then P(s) S 0 . We can extend P to a map P de ned on S S 0 as follows: if s 0 2 S 0 and (s) = s 0 , de ne P (s 0 ) = P(s). Condition 1(b) on guarantees that this extension is well de ned. A GSM is re exive (resp., re exive and transitive; partitional) if P restricted to S 0 is re exive (resp., re exive and transitive; partitional). Similarly, we can extend to a map de ned on S S 0 by de ning (p) = (p) fs 0 2 S 0 : p 2 ; ?1 (s 0 ) (p)g. That is, if s 0 2 S , then s 0 2 (p) i p 2 and s 2 (p) for some (and hence, by condition 1(a), all) s 2 S such that (s) = s 0 .
We can now de ne a satisfaction relation j = MR on GSMs. States in both S and S 0 are allowed on the left-hand side of j = MR , but they are treated di erently in the case of negation: 5 (M; s) j = MR p (for p 2 ) i s 2 (p) (M; s) j = MR '^ i both (M; s) j = MR ' and (M; s) j = MR (M; s) j = MR :' i (M; s) 6 j = MR ' and either s 2 S or s 2 S 0 and ' 2 L X ( ) (M; s) j = MR X' i (M; t) j = MR ' for all t 2 P (s). MR's extend the de nition of j = to L XA by taking A' to be an abbreviation for X' _ X:X:'.
The following simple lemma, which will be of use in the proof of the main result, casts some light on the connection between the states s and (s).
Lemma 3.1: Given a GSM M = (S; S 0 ; ; P; ) and s 2 S such that (s) 2 S 0 , then
Proof: A straightforward induction on the structure of '; left to the reader. 5 My presentation is slightly di erent from that of MR, but is easily seen to be equivalent. 6 4 Relating GSMs and awareness structures Awareness (resp., an awareness structure M) is said to be propositionally determined if it (resp., the awareness function in M) is generated by primitive propositions and the agent knows what formulas he is aware of. In this section, I prove that partitional GSMs and propositionally determined awareness structures are equivalent in a strong sense. Assume that we are working over a xed set of primitive propositions.
Theorem 4.1:
(a) Given a propositionally determined awareness structure M = (S; ; K; A) there is a GSM M 0 = (S; S 0 ; ; P; ) such that for all formulas ' 2 L X ( ), we have
Moreover, if M is re exive (resp., re exive and transitive, partitional), then so is M 0 .
(b) Given a GSM M = (S; S 0 ; ; P; ), there is a propositionally determined awareness structure M 0 = (S; ; K; A) such that for all formulas ' 2 L X ( ), we have
Proof: For part (a), given a propositional awareness structure M = (S; ; K; A), for each state s 2 S, de ne (s) = A(s) \ . Let S 0 = S be a disjoint copy of S (where s 0 2 S 0 is the copy of s 2 S), let S 0 = fs 0 2 S 0 : (s) = g, let P(s) = ft 0 : (s; t) 2 Kg, and let (s) = s 0 . Let M 0 = (S; S 0 ; ; P; ). Since M is propositionally determined, it follows that if (s) 2 S 0 , then P(s) S 0 . Thus, M 0 is a GSM. Moreover, it is immediate that M 0 is re exive (resp., re exive and transitive, partitional) if M is.
I now show by induction on the structure of formulas that for all states s 2 S and formulas ' 2 L X ( ), we have
If ' is the primitive proposition p, this is immediate from the de nitions. If ' is of the form ' 1^'2 or :' 0 , then it follows immediately from the induction hypothesis. Now suppose that ' is of the form X' 0 . Let ' consist of all the primitive propositions that appear in '. Then we have (M; s) j = FH X' 0 i (M; t) j = FH ' 0 for all t 2 K(s) and (since awareness in M is propositionally determined) ' A(s). By the induction hypothesis, the latter condition is true i (M; t) j = MR ' 0 for all t 2 K(s) and (s) 2 S 0 for some ' . By Lemma 3.1, it follows that this is true i (M; (t)) j = MR ' 0 for all t 2 K(s). But this, in turn, is true i (M; s) j = MR X' 0 .
For part (b), given a GSM M = (S; S 0 ; ; P; ), where S 0 = S 0 , de ne an awareness structure M 0 = (S; ; K; A), where A(s) is generated by the primitive propositions in if (s) 2 S 0 and K(s) = ft : (t) 2 P(s)g. Since (s; t) 2 K and (s) 2 S 0 implies that (t) 2 S 0 , it easily follows that M 0 is a propositionally determined awareness structure.
Moreover, M 0 is re exive (resp., re exive and transitive, partitional) if M is.
I now prove by induction on the structure of ' that (M; s) j = ' i (M 0 ; s) j = ' for all states s 2 S. Again, the argument is immediate in the case that ' is a primitive proposition, conjunction, or negation. Finally, the argument in the case of X' 0 is essentially identical to that given in part (a).
Theorem 4.1 shows that, in a precise sense, GSMs and propositionally determined awareness structures are equivalent, at least as far as the language L X is concerned. 6 This equivalence does not extend to the language L XA in general. In GSMs, A' is, by de nition, equivalent to X' _ X:X'. By Lemma 2.1, this equivalence holds as well in partitional awareness structures, but it does not hold in general. That is, in partitional awareness structures, Theorem 4.1 holds, not just for the language L X , but for the language L XA as well. However, in general, Theorem 4.1 holds only for the language L X .
Axiomatizing Awareness Structures
The axioms that characterize awareness structures depend on three things: (1) the choice of language, (2) the assumptions made about the K operator, and (3) the assumptions made about awareness. I discuss axiomatizations with respect to some of the assumptions I have made in this paper. Some of the results, as noted below, are taken from Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995, Section 9.5].
Since the notion of axiomatization of a logic is somewhat di erent from the standard notion of axiomatizing an operator familiar in the economics literature, I now brie y review the relevant de nitions. An axiom system AX consists of a collection of axioms and inference rules. An axiom is a formula, and an inference rule has the form \from ' 1 ; : : : ; ' k infer ," where ' 1 ; : : : ; ' k ; are formulas. Typically (and, in particular, in this paper), the axioms are all instances of axiom schemes. Thus, for example, an axiom scheme such as K i ' ) ' de nes an in nite collection of axioms, one for each choice of '. A proof in AX consists of a sequence of formulas, each of which is either an axiom in AX or follows by an application of an inference rule. A proof is said to be a proof of the formula ' if the last formula in the proof is '. We say ' is provable in AX, and write AX`', if there is a proof of ' in AX; similarly, we say that ' is consistent with AX if :' is not provable in AX.
Given a class M 0 of (awareness) structures, a formula ' is valid in M 0 if (M; s) j = ' for every structure M 2 M 0 and state s in M. An axiom system AX is said to be sound for a language L with respect to a class M 0 of structures if every formula in L provable in AX is valid with respect to every structure in M 0 . The system AX is complete for L with respect to M 0 if every formula in L that is valid in M 0 is provable in AX. We think of AX as characterizing the class M 0 if it provides a sound and complete axiomatization of that class. Soundness and completeness provide a connection between the syntactic notion of provability and the semantic notion of validity.
Axiomatizing the language L K : a review
I begin with a review of standard axiomatizations for the language L K , since they form the basis of the axiomatizations with awareness.
Consider the following axioms:
Prop. All substitution instances of tautologies of propositional calculus The system with axioms and rules Prop, K, MP, and Gen has been called K. If we add T to K, we get the axiom system T; if we add 4 to T, we get S4; if we add 5 to S4, we get S5. (Many other systems can also be formed Chellas 1980] The following result is easy to prove (very similar results are proved in Chellas 1980] I said earlier that awareness being closed under subformulas corresponded to A1{ A5, awareness being generated by primitive propositions corresponded to A1{A10, selfre ective agents were characterized by A9, and knowledge of awareness corresponded to A10 and A11. I now make this precise. Let C 1 = fA1, : : : , A5g, let C 2 = C 1 fA6, : : : , A10g, let C 3 = fA9g, and let C 4 = fA11; A12g. I use the superscripts csub, gpp, sr, and ka to restrict to awareness structures where awareness is closed under subformulas, awareness is generated by primitive propositions, the agent is self-re ective, and the agent knows which formulas he is aware of, respectively. Thus, for example, M rst;csub;ka consists of partitional awareness structures where awareness is closed under subformulas and the agent knows which formulas he is aware of. Theorem 5.3: Let C be a (possibly empty) subset of fC 1 ; C 2 ; C 3 ; C 4 g and let C be the corresponding subset of fcsub, gpp,sr,kag. For formulas in the language L KXA (a) K fA0g C is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to M C , (b) T fA0g C is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to M r;C , (c) S4 fA0g C is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to M rt;C , (d) S5 fA0g C is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to M rst;C . Proof: A straightforward modi cation of the proof of Theorem 5.1; I omit details here.
Axiomatizing L XA
Perhaps the most interesting issues arise in providing an axiomatization for L XA . This forces us to consider the properties of explicit knowledge directly, without being able to take the indirect route through implicit knowledge and awareness provided by A0. The interplay between assumptions about awareness and axioms for explicit knowledge is far more signi cant here than for the language L KXA . To start with, consider propositionally determined awareness.
Let the axioms K X , T X , and 4 X be identical to K, T, and 4, respectively, except that K is replaced by X. We get 5 X and Gen X by replacing K by X in 5 in Gen and, in addition, relativizing to awareness. More precisely: 5 X . :X'^A:X' ) X:X'. Gen X . From ' infer A' ) X'.
The analogous relativization to awareness is unnecessary in the case of K X and 4 X , given the restriction to propositionally determined awareness. For example, in the case of K, we would have
However, if awareness is generated by primitive propositions, then A follows from A('^ ) (which in turn follows from X('^ )). What happens to the axiom A0 that characterized X and the axioms A1{A12 that characterize propositionally determined awareness in the context of the language L XA , where there is no K operator? Clearly, A0 becomes A0 X . X' ) A'.
A1{A4 and A6{A9 remain unchanged, since they do not mention the K operator, while A5 and A10 disappear; they are unnecessary, since K is not in the language. A11 changes to A11 X , which is the result of replacing K by X. This is clearly sound in propositionally determined awareness structures. Finally, A12 disappears: if the agent is not aware of ', then the agent cannot be aware of :A', and thus cannot explicitly know that he is unaware of '.
My completeness proofs use one additional rule of inference, which says that certain formulas should be irrelevant in a proof.
Irr. If no primitive propositions in ' appear in , then from :A' ) infer . 8 8 This is an instance of a more general inference rule which is essentially the analogue of a well-known result in rst-order logic called Craig's Interpolation Lemma Craig 1957 ]. Craig's Interpolation Lemma says that if ' and are formulas in rst-order logic and ' ) is provable, then there is a formula which involves only symbols that appear in both ' and such that both ' ) and ) are provable. It follows that if ' and have no symbols in common and ' ) is provable, then either :' is provable or is provable. The analogue to the general Craig Interpolation Lemma holds for the language L KXA , but proving it is beyond the scope of this paper.
I strongly suspect that Irr is unnecessary and follows from the other axioms and inference rules I have stated. However, I have not been able to prove this.
Let K X consist of Prop, MP, K X , Gen X , A0 X , A1{A4, A6{A9, A11, and Irr; T X , S4 X , and S5 X are obtained by successively adding T X , 4 X , and 5 X to K X . Theorem 5.4: For formulas in the language L XA :
(a) K X is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to M gpp;ka , (c) T X is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to M r;gpp;ka , (c) S4 X is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to M rt;gpp;ka , (d) S5 X is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to M rst;gpp;ka . Proof: I just sketch the proof of part (a) here, and then indicate how it can be modi ed to prove (b){(d). For soundness, observe that all the axioms are valid and all the inference rules preserve validity. For example, in the case Gen X , if ' is valid in M, then it is easy to check that A' ) X' is valid. In the case of Irr, suppose that :A' ) is valid. Suppose that, by way of contradiction, is not valid. Then there is a structure M = (S; ; K; A) 2 M gpp;ka and state s in M such that (M; s) j = : . Now let M 0 = (S; ; K; A 0 ) be the structure where all components agree with M except possibly A 0 and A 0 (t) = A(t)?f : and ' have a primitive proposition in commong. It is easy to check that M 0 2 M gpp;ka . Moreover, an easy induction on the structure of shows that for every formula that does not have any primitive propositions in common with ' and for every state t 2 S, we have (M; t) j = i (M 0 ; t) j = . In particular, (M 0 ; s) j = : . Moreover, by construction, (M 0 ; s) j = :A'. But this contradicts the validity of :A' ) . Thus, it must be the case that is valid, as desired. Now an easy induction on the length of proofs shows that every formula ' provable in K X is valid in M gpp;ka .
To prove completeness, it clearly su ces to show that every formula ' that is satis able in M gpp;ka (i.e., every formula ' such that M; s j = ' for some M 2 M gpp;ka ) is K X -consistent. The proof of this uses the idea of canonical structures. This approach was introduced in the economics literature by Aumann 1989] , although the basic idea is well known in the modal logic community, and seems to have been introduced independently by Kaplan 1966] , Makinson 1966] , and Lemmon and/or Scott Lemmon 1977] .
Given an axiom system AX, a formula ' is AX-consistent if :' is not provable in AX. A nite set of formulas is AX-consistent if their conjunction is; an in nite set of formulas is AX-consistent if every nite subset of its formulas is. Finally, F is a maximal AX-consistent set of formulas if F is AX-consistent and every strict superset of F is not AX-consistent.
De ne the canonical K X model M c = (S c ; c ; K c ; A c ) as follows:
S c consists of all maximal K X -consistent sets of formulas (thus, each state in S c is a set of formulas); c (p) = fs 2 S c : p 2 sg for each p 2 ; (s; t) 2 K c i f' : X' 2 sg fAp : Ap 2 s; p 2 g f:Ap : :Ap 2 s; p 2 g t; A(s) = f' : A' 2 sg.
Observe that it follows from A1{A4 and A6{A9 that awareness in M c is generated by primitive propositions. Moreover, the construction of K c and A6{A9 guarantees that the agent knows which formulas he is aware of in M c . Thus, M c is propositionally determined.
I now show that ' 2 s i (M c ; s) j = ', by induction on the structure of ' (where primitive propositions and formulas of the form A' 0 are treated as being \structurally simpler" than all other formulas). If ' is a primitive proposition or of the form A' 0 , then this is immediate from the de nition. If ' is a conjunction or a negation, it follows easily from standard properties of maximal consistent sets (in particular, the facts if F is a maximal consistent set, then '^ 2 F i both ' 2 F and 2 F and that :' 2 F i ' = 2 F). Finally, suppose that ' is of the form X' 0 . If X' 0 2 s, then since s is a maximal K X -consistent set, it follows from A0 X that A' 0 2 s. Moreover, by construction of K, if (s; t) 2 K c , then ' 0 2 t. By the induction hypothesis, it follows that (M c ; s) j = A' 0 and (M c ; t) j = ' 0 for all t such that (s; t) 2 K c . Thus, (M c ; s) j = X' 0 . Conversely, suppose that (M c ; s) j = X' 0 . The key step in showing that X' 0 2 s is provided by the following claim.
Claim: Let 
It is easy to see using A1{A4, A6{A9, and A0 X and the fact that all the formulas in F 0 2 have the form Ap for some p 2 that
Using A11 X , it is immediate that
Using axiom K X , Prop, and MP, we get that
A standard argument using K X and Gen X shows that, for arbitrary formulas 1 and 2 , we have 2 s. Then, by the claim, f:' 0 g F 1 F 2 F 3 is K X -consistent. Thus, there must be a maximal K X -consistent set t f:' 0 g F 1 F 2 F 3 . By construction, (s; t) 2 K c . By the induction hypothesis, (M c ; t) j = :' 0 . But this contradicts the assumption that (M c ; s) j = X' 0 . Thus, it must be the case that X' 0 2 s, as desired. This completes the completeness proof in the case if K X .
The modi cations required to deal with M r , M rt , and M rst are standard. Indeed, all that needs to be done to convert the completeness proof for K X to one for T X (resp., S4 X , S5 X ) is to build the canonical model using maximal T X -(resp., S4 X -, S5 X -) consistent sets of formulas as states and to observe that the K c relation must be re exive (resp., re exive and transitive, an equivalence relation). I leave the straightforward details to the reader.
MR provide an axiomatization they call U for the language L XA which they prove to be sound and complete for partitional GSMs. From Theorem 4.1, it follows immediately that S5 X and U are equivalent, so S5 X is a sound and complete axiomatization for partitional GSMs and U is a sound and complete axiomatization for partitional propositionally determined awareness structures. That is, S5 X provides an alternate axiomatization of (un)awareness in partitional GSMs. Note that it does not follow, however, that K X (resp., T X , S4 X ) is a sound and complete axiomatization for the language L XA for GSMs (resp., re exive, re exive and transitive) GSMs. This is because, as I observed earlier, the de nition of A di ers between GSMs and awareness structures in the non-partitional case.
What happens if we relax the assumption that awareness is propositionally determined? For ease of exposition, I continue to assume that the agent knows what formulas he is aware of. (It is possible to obtain axiomatizations if we drop this assumption, but they are uglier.) In this case, we need to use K 0 X rather than K X . However, it does not seem that K 0 X and Gen X su ce to get completeness. However, the following generalization of RK does su ce: RK X . From ' 1^: : :^' n ) infer X' 1^: : :^X' n^A ) X .
In the case of the K operator, Proposition 5.2 says that (in the presence of Prop and MP) RK is equivalent to K and Gen. With awareness, clearly Gen X is just RK X in the special case that n = 0 and K X follows immediately from RK X in the case that n = 2, since ('^(' ) )) ) is a propositional tautology, as is the fact that ' 1^'2 ) is equivalent to ' 1 ) (' 2 ) ), for all choices of ' 1 , ' 2 , and . However, RK X does not seem to follow from in general from K X and Gen X . To understand why, consider why RK follows from K and Gen in the case that n = 2. Using Prop, from ' 1^'2 ) we can conclude ' 1 ) (' 2 ) ). (The two formulas are propositionally equivalent.) Now applying Gen, we can conclude K(' 1 ) (' 2 ) )). Now two applications of the axiom K together propositional reasoning (Prop and MP) given us K' 1 ) K(' 2 ) ) and then K' 1 ) (K' 2 ) K ), which is equivalent to (K' 1^K ' 2 ) ) K . This reasoning breaks down if we replace K by X. The problem is that we cannot apply Gen X to conclude X(' 1 ) (' 2 ) ), since there is no reason to believe that A(' 1 ) (' 2 ) )) holds, even if X' 1 and X' 2 and A hold. (We can draw this conclusion if awareness is propositionally generated and, indeed, in the presence of Prop and MP, RK X is equivalent to K X and Gen X .)
We must generalize RK X still further in the presence of knowledge of awareness, as follows: Again, RK + X seems strictly stronger that RK X and the obvious extensions of A11 and A12, which are A11 0 X . A'^AA' ) XA'. A12 0 X . :A'^A:A' ) X:A'.
While A11 0 X and A12 0 X are easily seen to follow from RK + X (in the presence of Prop and MP), the converse does not seem to hold. In this spirit of RK + X , consider the following axioms and rules: Let C 0 1 = fA1, : : : , A4g, let C 0 2 = C 0 1 fA6, : : : , A9g, and let C 3 = fA9g. Theorem 5.5: Let C be a (possibly empty) subset of fC 0 1 ; C 0 2 ; C 0 3 g and let C be the corresponding subset of fcsub, gpp,srg. For formulas in the language L XA (a) fProp, MP, RK + X , A0 X g C is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to M C;ra . (b) fProp, MP, RK + X , T X , A0 X g C is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to M r;C;ra , (c) fProp, MP, RK4 + X , T X , A0 X g C is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to M rt;C;ra , (d) fProp, MP, RK5 + X , T X , A0 X g C is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to M rst;C;ra .
Note that this means that we can replace K X and Gen X (resp., K X , Gen X , and 4 X ; K X , Gen X , 4 X , and 5 X ) by RK + X (resp., RK4 + X ; RK5 5 X ) to get an axiomatization equivalent to K X and T X (resp., S4 X ; S5 X ).
6 Discussion I have shown that GSMs can be viewed as a special case of awareness structures in a precise sense. The advantage of thinking in terms of awareness structures is that we can then consider other notions of awareness, not just ones generated by primitive propositions. For example, as observed by FH, it is possible to consider more computationally oriented notions of awareness (see Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995, Chapter 10] for more discussion of this issue). The problem is then to come up with interesting notions of awareness that have enough structure to allow for interesting mathematical analysis. I believe it should also be possible to use awareness structures to allow for natural reasoning about awareness and lack of it (so that an agent can reason, for example, about the possibility that she is unaware of certain features that another may be aware of). I am currently working on modeling such reasoning.
